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thusiastic confidence in the doctrine unfolded, and directness of application which is often startlingly convincing.

On the whole, this book from a distinguished psychologist should be a welcome addition to one's pedagogical library, force many to resort to experiment to verify or to refute the principles expounded, and, incidentally, prepare the way for the author's more systematic promised treatise on "psychological didactics."

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Clavis Universalis. ARTHUR COLLIER. Edited with Introduction and Notes by ETHEL BOWMAN. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co. 1909. Pp. xxv + 140. $1.50.

All students of the history of philosophy have reason to be grateful to the editor of this volume, to Professor Calkins, who appears to have inspired the preparation of it, and to the publishing house which has brought it out in a dignified but inexpensive form. The book seems to be an elaboration of a Master's thesis submitted by Miss Bowman at Wellesley College; would that, in the huge annual output of such lucubrations in our graduate schools, one in a score yielded a result so serviceable to the rest of the republic of letters! For Collier's "Clavis," a document of all but the highest interest and consequence in the history of English philosophy, has hitherto been virtually unprocurable. The original edition was already a rarity before the end of the eighteenth century; and Dr. Parr's "Collection of Metaphysical Tracts," 1837, which includes a reprint of the book, is long since out of print, and is accessible, in America, in very few libraries. The present volume gives the text complete, following the edition of Parr, together with a short biographical and historical introduction, and a few pages of notes. The editorial work, in general, has been carefully and competently done; use has been made of Benson's "Memoirs" of Collier, and the clues relating to him, and to his historical influence, to be found in Reid's and Hamilton's references to him, have been followed out, so far as American libraries permit. There are occasional marks of a too mechanical transcription from sources and of carelessness in the matter of proper names. Thus the same Scottish theologian figures as Robert Baron, in the "Notes," and as Baronius, in the "Introduction." Latin names are transferred to the English text in apparent ignorance of their meaning or English equivalents. In a list of writers known to Collier appear "Vincentius, Lirinensis, Suarez"; the first two presumably disguise the name of Vincent of Lerins. "Mogurtiae" and "Marpurgi" seem needlessly archaic ways of referring to Mayence and Marburg. Dugald Stewart's name is regularly misspelled. On the other hand, the "Introduction" probably gives correctly (following Hamilton) the name of the "Professor Eschenbach of Rostock," translator of the "Clavis" into German in 1756, about whom the present reviewer blundered in a paper in "Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James" (p. 289). The book is apparently not accessible on this side of the Atlantic; I supposed the translator to be C. E. Eschenbach, professor of

mathematics and anatomy at Rostock, a person of some contemporary celebrity. It appears that there was a more obscure Eschenbach, also of Rostock, bearing the Christian name of Johann Christoph, who was a theologian and metaphysician by trade; to him, seemingly, should be given the credit for making Collier, and Berkeley's "Dialogues," available to German readers.

Miss Bowman seems to me needlessly non-committal on the question of Collier's independence of Berkeley—or even slightly to confuse the question of independence with that of priority (pp. xxii–xxiv). Whether Collier hit upon the idealistic doctrine before Berkeley, may, indeed, be only "doubtful"; the point is, in any case, of small historical significance. But unless Collier's own statement be impeached, as well as several other substantial pieces of evidence, there can be no doubt whatever that the conclusions of the "Clavis" were arrived at long before they were published, and before the author of them knew anything of the speculations which a young Irishman in Dublin was then confiding to his Commonplace Book. And the fact that the two idealists arrived at their opinions independently is of sufficient historical interest to deserve to be unequivocally stated. The "Notes" trace out a number of parallelisms between Collier's and Berkeley's arguments; the value of the volume would have been increased if this had been done in a more complete and systematic manner, and some exact account given of the cases in which the proofs offered logically coincide, those in which Collier supplements Berkeley, and those in which Berkeley supplements Collier. The matters noted, however, are minor imperfections in a useful and well-executed piece of work.

Two results may conceivably follow from a more general acquaintance, on the part of students of philosophy, with Collier's little treatise. One is a certain modification of the usual account of the filiation of ideas in the history of English thought. In Berkeley subjective idealism seemed to emerge chiefly as a consequence of tendencies that owed their vogue largely to the influence of Locke—empiricism, nominalism, the demand for simplification and intellectual parsimony, the desire to set definite bounds to the scope of human knowledge. Berkeley's task is commonly, and not erroneously, represented as consisting in carrying out Locke's task and Locke's presuppositions with greater rigor and consistency; his "New Question," says Fraser, was: "What in reason should we *mean* when with Locke we assume the real existence of 'matter'; and to what sort of power should we refer the phenomena that are present to our senses—if, in the spirit of Locke, we are to be faithful to the facts?" Now, Collier can not be placed in any line of development that runs through Locke. It is scarcely credible that Collier was unacquainted with the "Essay concerning Human Understanding," especially since his friend John Norris wrote a reply to it, 1694; but at all events he was quite uninfluenced by it. Malebranche and Norris for him provided the sufficient basis for idealism. He is, therefore, the chief (though not the only) witness to the fact that Cartesianism of itself tended directly towards idealism; and that this tendency was strengthened and accelerated when the Cartesian

problem of the psycho-physical relation was approached with the presuppositions of a Platonistic epistemology and a Platonistic metaphysics of the absolute. There is, thus, a double line of descent in English idealism; and Berkeley represents (in the main) the cadet branch of the family. This historical fact is, perhaps, not so generally emphasized as it should be. With a fuller recognition of it may come an appreciation of other features of seventeenth-century English Platonism which are not less important in themselves, as types of philosophic doctrine, and are more important as historic influences.

It is not unlikely, also, that teachers of philosophy will make use of parts of the "Clavis" as a means of first introducing undergraduates to idealism in one of its typical historic forms. Collier's English has none of the charm, the ease and urbanity, of Berkeley's style; he is never likely to take rank as an English classic. But if his book is inferior as literature, it is in some respects superior as argumentation, and especially as pedagogy. Compared with the "Principles of Human Knowledge," the "Clavis" has more of the virtues of a good text-book. It begins with explicit definitions and explicit warnings against possible misunderstandings; its arguments are classified, catalogued, and correlated; and it makes less of the alleged sheer meaninglessness of the expression "existence without the mind," and more of the really serious arguments from the antinomies and from the relativity of all sensible properties. Berkeley's mode of approach to his conclusion in the "Principles" usually, I find, produces upon the mind of beginners the impression that he is begging the question from the outset; such an impression is not likely to be produced by the reading of Collier. Finally, Collier does not encumber the argument with the essentially separable question concerning the existence of "abstract ideas." For these reasons, the best historical introduction to idealism would seem to me to consist in selections from the "Clavis" followed by parallel and supplementary passages from Berkeley's "Dialogues."

It is to be hoped that the present welcome volume is the harbinger of a series of new editions of the more important writings of the English Platonists. It is highly discreditable to English and American scholarship that we possess neither modern and accessible editions of the texts of most of these writings, nor any adequate historical study of the movement of thought which they represent. The greatest desideratum here, perhaps, is, first, a volume of judicious selections from the principal epistemological and metaphysical treatises of the Platonists—which should include something of Lord Brook, of More's "Enchiridion Metaphysicum" and "Antidote against Atheism," of Norris's "Reflections" on Locke, his "Theory of the Ideal World" and his "Metaphysical Essay towards the Demonstration of a God," of Collier's "Specimen of True Philosophy," and of Burthogge's three principal writings; and, second, a corresponding volume of selections representing Platonistic ethics, which should include a translation of More's "Enchiridion Ethicum." Until the literature is thus made available, one of the most distinctive, most influential, and most interesting movements in English reflection remains not only virtually unstudied, but also scarcely accessible to study.

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